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A Model of Competition Between Online and Traditional Firms 
Sivakumar Viswanathan  
Information Systems Department, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, 
44, West 4th Street, NY, NY-10012. {sviswana@stern.nyu.edu;  fax-212-995-4228} 
Abstract 
This paper attempts to model the strategic interaction 
between firms in online and traditional markets. It 
analyzes how each market affects the competitive 
characteristics of the other. Existing research on 
electronic markets has focused largely on their welfare-
enhancing features. However, electronic markets coexist 
with traditional markets with each strongly influencing 
the other. Results show that the profits of firms in 
competing channels increase as they differentiate 
themselves as much as possible from each other, and by 
differentiating themselves based on the characteristics 
over which consumers have the maximum variety in 
relative valuations. The choice of the factors of 
differentiation, however, is crucial, as are the relative 
sizes of the online and offline markets. The results also 
indicate that neglecting the impact of traditional markets 
on online firms risks oversimplification, and might lead to 
incorrect prescriptions to both offline and online firms.    
1. Motivation and Research Questions 
“As demand for eSchwab’s $29.95 online trades was 
booming beyond expectations, customers with Charles 
Schwab’s traditional brokerage still had to pay an 
average of $65 per trade. The two-tiered pricing was 
awkward. Soon Schwab decided to price all trades at 
$29.95, thus adopting the same pricing strategy both 
online and off.” - “Internet Defense Strategy- Cannibalize 
Yourself”, Fortune, Sep., 1999.  
Online retailing has been growing rapidly, and is 
soon predicted to account for a significant portion of the 
overall retail revenues. Given the explosive growth of 
online markets, there have been claims that Internet 
retailing would displace traditional firms and markets in 
several sectors. As a retailing channel, the Web differs 
significantly from traditional channels in several ways. It 
offers convenient access, wider variety, and ease of 
search/comparison.  Consumers who value such features 
prefer shopping online. However, a large number of 
consumers prefer shopping via traditional channels. 
Overall, therefore, a more realistic scenario is one where 
both online and traditional firms co-exist, competing 
either for an overlapping set of consumers, or serving 
orthogonal segments. With more and more traditional 
firms beginning to realize the potential of online retailing, 
there has been a surge in the number of hybrid firms 
operating in both domains. According to recent surveys 
by Media Metrix and Nielsen, the lists of 50 top online 
retailing sites read like a Who's Who of land-based 
retailing. Gap.com, eSchwab, JCPenney.com, Wal-
Mart.com and Barnesandnoble.com were among the 
hybrid firms that made the grade. 
One of the serious challenges faced by traditional 
firms moving online is the issue of integrating their online 
strategies with their traditional operations. Since online 
markets are characterized by severe price competition, 
traditional firms that move online are forced to match 
their competitors’ prices, and this can conflict with their 
pricing strategies offline. As illustrated by the quote 
above, Charles Schwab was forced to adopt the same 
pricing strategy both online and off. Wal-Mart, Home 
Depot, Electronics Boutique and Circuit City are 
examples of some other firms that have streamlined their 
traditional operations to be in sync with their online 
operations. 
With more and more traditional firms moving online, 
Web-based markets and traditional markets are no longer 
isolated but strongly influence one another. The fact that 
online markets coexist with and compete with firms in 
traditional markets has been largely overlooked in the 
research literature. Most of the existing research on 
electronic commerce (for instance, see Bakos,1997, 
Brynjolfsson and Smith,1999; Bakos et al.,1999) that has 
focused on studying the efficiency of electronic markets, 
has neglected this strategic interaction between firms 
operating in the two domains. 
This research seeks to address this issue by analyzing 
the impact of Internet retailing on traditional brick-and-
mortar firms. More specifically, it seeks to examine how 
the strategic interaction between online, traditional as well 
as hybrid firms which have a presence in both markets, 
impact competitive outcomes in both markets. The 
differences between online and traditional channels, 
makes this issue more interesting. A spatial differentiation 
model (Hotelling 1929, Salop 1979) is constructed to 
examine the impact of the interactions between these two 
markets. The features of the equilibrium configurations 
and its sensitivity to various parameters are also analyzed. 
Finally, the welfare implications of this model are 
compared with the benchmark case where the online 
markets are independent of traditional markets.  
2. A Model of Competition between Online 
and Offline Firms 
In this model the online and traditional markets are 
each represented by a unit circle. There are three types of 
firms – pure online firms located wholly online, 
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 traditional ‘brick-and-mortar’ firms located wholly 
offline, and hybrid firms with presence in both markets. 
Each firm i sells a commodity product and charges a price 
pi. While the products themselves are commodities, the 
firms innovate on features of the buying experience 
associated with the products. Examples of such features 
include product comparison and evaluation information, 
pre-purchase help and support (perhaps from a live 
salesperson), product layout in the store, ease of purchase 
(for instance, one-click ordering), immediacy of delivery, 
customer service and after-sale support.  It is precisely 
these channel-related features, and aspects of the buying 
experience that separates competing online and traditional 
firms (Steinfield and Whitten, 1999).  
Consumers are utility-maximizers and each consumer 
is in the market for one unit of a product in each period. 
Consumers have single-peaked preferences over the 
heterogeneous features of the channel. For instance, some 
consumers may want to ‘feel’ the product prior to 
purchase, and have a salesperson inform them about 
relative product characteristics, while others may prefer 
browsing and studying products themselves on the Web. 
Thus, each consumer has an ideal configuration of 
channel-related features (for instance, active salesperson 
involvement, immediate delivery and a three-year 
warranty) that gives her the highest utility and the 
consumer incurs a loss of utility when she buys from a 
firm other than her ideal one. This is referred to as the 
misfit cost.  
Consumers are uniformly distributed on each unit 
circle according to the position of the peak of their utility 
functions. Seller choices of channel-related features are 
differentiated along the same dimension. Consumers are 
assumed to have a high reservation price ř, relative to 
their total costs, which ensures that all firms are in direct 
competition and that all consumers in the market buy a 
differentiated product (Economides, 1989). Given the 
utility functions, the problem of utility maximization for 
consumers is equivalent to cost minimization where the 
costs to the consumer includes the price that she pays for 
her product added to the misfit cost. Firms choose 
strategies that maximize their profits and each firm 
decides the choice of its location and price, given the 
location and price of the other firms in its market. Firms 
play a two-stage game, with firms simultaneously 
choosing locations in the first stage followed by a 
simultaneous choice of prices in the second stage. The 
equilibrium for the two-stage game in prices and locations 
are derived. 
3. Analysis and Discussion 
This sections analyzes the simplest case where there 
is one firm of each type in each market – firm a, in market 
A, firm b, in market B, and firm h, the hybrid firm. The 
initial model assumes that consumers are either online or 
offline and consumers in each market purchase products 
only from firms in their market. The hybrid firm prices 
identically in both markets. These constraints are later 
relaxed to examine the implications of consumers 
switching across markets, as well as the implications of 
the hybrid firm being able to price discriminate across 
markets.  
At equilibrium the firms locate opposite each other in 
the unit circle and each firm’s price takes into 
consideration the price of the other firm (firm h) in its 
market. However, the hybrid firm, by virtue of being 
present in both markets, takes into consideration the 
prices of firms in both markets in choosing its price. The 
hybrid firm always prices between the prices of the pure 
online firm and the brick-and-mortar firm. Also, the firm 
in the market with the higher misfit costs, prices the 
highest, while the firm in the market with the lower misfit 
costs prices the lowest of the three (see figure 1). As 
consumers’ disutility from buying a product other than 
their ideal one, increases, firms are able to charge a higher 
price. However, in the market in which consumers find 
the two firm’s products to be relatively close substitutes 
(i.e., the market with lower misfit costs), the firms are 
forced to maintain lower prices.  
Figure 1 illustrates the impact of varying parameters 
(misfit costs in market A) on firm prices. As consumers in 
market A become more sensitive to the channel-related 
differences and suffer a greater loss of utility from 
mismatch, both the firms in that market (firm a as well as 
the hybrid firm) have an incentive to raise prices. 
However, the hybrid firm by virtue of being present both 
online as well as offline, is more sensitive to the 
competitive conditions in its other market as well and 
hence is limited by the characteristics of that market. Thus 
although the hybrid firm would rather price higher in the 
less competitive market, it has to take into consideration 
the competition in its other market (market B) in setting 
its price. As illustrated in figure 1, a firm (firm b) wholly 
inside one market is forced to react to changes in the 
competitive conditions in the other market despite no 
direct changes in the features of its own market (market 
B).  
Thus, despite the fact that the pure online and the 
traditional firms do not compete for the same set of 
consumers, the presence of the hybrid firm reacting to 
competitive conditions in both the markets, introduces 
strategic interdependence between these two firms. The 
relative sizes of the two markets (as indicated by the 
number of consumers in each market - na, nb) also affects 
the prices and profits of the firms in each market. As the 
online market grows in size relative to the traditional 
market, the online market begins to gain more importance 
and has a greater influence on the prices of the hybrid and 
online firm.  
Base Case - To examine the impact of the presence of the 
hybrid firm in both markets, this is compared with the 
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 base case where there is no ‘hybrid’ firm and the two 
markets are independent of each other. This is identical to 
the case where the hybrid firm is able to price 
discriminate across markets. Comparison with the base 
case helps us understand how the presence of the hybrid 
firm alters the competitive characteristics of the two 
markets at equilibrium. As illustrated in figure 1, when 
the markets are completely independent, the firms have an 
incentive to charge a higher price and thereby lowering 
net consumer welfare.  
 
Overlapping Markets – It was initially assumed that 
consumers in each market purchase only from firms in 
their own market. However, as acknowledged earlier 
online markets and offline markets increasingly compete 
for the same set of consumers in many segments and 
consumers may access both markets. In other words, as 
the degree of overlap between the two markets increase, 
consumers in one market have increasing access to firms 
in the other market. As consumers from one market 
purchase products from the other market, they face a 
switching cost. In the limit, when the switching costs for 
consumers is zero, i.e., when the two markets completely 
overlap, all the firms charge the same price. This price is 
the same as the price charged by the hybrid firm when the 
two markets are interdependent (see figure 1).  
4. Conclusion and Further Extensions 
The results indicate that the prices and the total 
profits for all three firms are the highest when the two 
markets are completely independent and the prices and 
total profits are the lowest when the two markets overlap 
completely. The prices and the total profits for all firms, 
when the markets exhibit strategic interdependence due to 
the presence of the hybrid firm, fall in between these two 
extremes. In summary, 
• The efficiency and competitive characteristics of online 
markets are significantly altered due to competition 
from traditional and hybrid firms.  
• When online markets are more competitive than 
traditional markets and consumers differ in their 
channel preferences, offline firms may well be best 
served by specializing in, and highlighting their real-
world strengths, rather than a hybrid online-offline 
strategy.  
• However, when online markets are growing relative to 
offline markets, traditional firms may benefit by 
moving online and adopting a hybrid strategy. 
• Neglecting the interdependence between online and 
traditional markets and the role of the hybrid firms 
provides a misleading picture and may lead to 
overestimating the efficiency and welfare-enhancing 
properties of online markets.  
Future extensions include incorporating other 
pertinent differences between online and traditional 
markets, such as search costs and network externalities, 
and analyzing the impact of additional hybrid firms on the 
equilibrium characteristics of the model.  
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